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Abstract
Women’s rights and economic development are highly correlated. Today,
the discrepancy between the legal rights of women and men is much larger
in developing compared to developed countries. Historically, even in coun-
tries that are now rich women had few rights before economic development
took off. Is development the cause of expanding women’s rights, or con-
versely, do women’s rights facilitate development? We argue that there is
truth to both hypotheses. The literature on the economic consequences of
women’s rights documents that more rights for women lead to more spend-
ing on health and children, which should benefit development. The political-
economy literature on the evolution of women’s rights finds that technolog-
ical change increased the costs of patriarchy for men, and thus contributed
to expanding women’s rights. Combining these perspectives, we discuss the
theory of Doepke and Tertilt (2009), where an increase in the return to hu-
man capital induces men to vote for women’s rights, which in turn promotes
growth in human capital and income per capita.
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1 Introduction
In today’s developed countries, by and large, women enjoy the same legal rights
as men. This has not always been the case. Two hundred years ago, in most
countries women were considered property of men (typically either a father or a
husband) and had no intrinsic rights of their own. They usually could not own
property or sign contracts, they had no control over their own body, they could
not vote, they had no legal way to end a marriage, and they had no access to
their children after a separation. What explains the expansion of women’s rights
since? And what was the economic impact of these changes? In this paper, we
provide a survey of the economics and politics of womens rights.
We focus on legal rights to emphasize the distinction between equality in oppor-
tunity as opposed to equality in outcomes.1 Men and women are different, and
hence gender differences in outcomes such as labor force participation, life ex-
pectancy, or political involvement should not be surprising. For example, even
a small comparative advantage of women in child-rearing may lead to an op-
timal division of labor in which many women specialize in home production
(Becker 1991). Inequalities in outcomes do not necessarily imply that women are
disadvantaged. However, if formal rights are gender-specific, then women are
denied the same opportunities as men. A large literature on gender differences
in outcomes exists, whereas the formal rights of women have received increasing
attention only recently.2
We start by documenting the salient facts on women’s rights in relation to eco-
nomic development. In contemporary cross-country data, measures of women’s
rights and development are highly correlated.3 The fact that women in today’s
least developed countries have the least legal rights might suggest that rights
1While the focus is on formal rights, we sometimes also describe de facto rights, such as
whether violence against women is accepted in a society or not.
2There exists a substantial body of work on other examples of expanding legal rights, such as
the abolition of slavery and franchise extensions in the nineteenth century. However, explana-
tions for these phenomena (such as the threat of violence and revolution) usually do not fit the
case of women’s rights, calling for a separate analysis.
3Duflo (2005) and Sinha, Raju, and Morrison (2007) provide surveys on the relationship be-
tween gender inequality and development. See also the 2012 World Development Report on
Gender Equality and Development.
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will expand naturally once economic development takes hold, just as they did
in developed countries. However, there are important differences between to-
day’s poor countries and the historical situation in rich countries. Focusing on
the cases of the United States and England, we show that the historical expan-
sion of women’s rights unfolded through distinct stages: basic economic rights
came first, political rights were next, and equal treatment in the labor market and
greater control over their own body ultimately followed. In contrast, in most
African countries women gained formal political rights (as part of the end of
colonialism) before obtaining economic rights. Moreover, there are many spe-
cific traditions (such as foot binding, child marriage, and witch killings) affecting
the rights of women that are specific to certain cultures. Contemporary phenom-
ena, such as HIV/AIDS, sex-selective abortions, and international sex trafficking
also represent challenges to gender equality that were not present in earlier time
periods (Kristof and WuDunn 2009).4
After reviewing the facts, we describe the economic consequences of women’s
rights. The bulk of the literature focuses on the effects of property (often land)
rights for women. In line with economic intuition, a number of empirical studies
find that more rights lead to a redistribution of resources towards women and
higher investment in both physical and human capital. Some studies find a de-
crease in fertility when women obtain more economic rights. Further, equality
in the division of marital assets tends to decrease female labor force participa-
tion. There is also research on the economic consequences of including women
in politics through suffrage and gender quotas. The main finding here is that
when women are involved in politics, both as voters and as policymakers, the
composition of government spending shifts towards higher expenditures related
to health and children. Some studies also find an overall increase in government
expenditures, but here the evidence is less robust. Finally, improvements in wo-
men’s control over their own body seem to increase their career prospects and life
satisfaction, and may positively affect female bargaining power in the household.
The political-economy literature on the origins of women’s rights is relatively
4For example, a myth in some African tribes is that sex with a virgin cures HIV (Leclerc-
Madlala 2002).
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small.5 Why were women’s rights changed as economic growth took hold? Con-
sidering that women are physically weaker than men, it is not surprising that ini-
tially men dominated society and chose to endow women with an inferior legal
position. What is more puzzling is that men ultimately gave up their control over
women. A recent literature tries to understand the economic forces behind the ex-
pansion in women’s rights. The forces can be grouped into two broad categories.
On the one hand, general cultural changes may have changed male attitudes
towards women’s rights. On the other hand, technological change may have
altered men’s economic incentives for extending rights to women. We discuss
evidence for each of these explanations. While culture may have played some in-
dependent role, the existing explanations suggest that technological change may
have driven both cultural attitudes about women’s rights and the expansion of
rights itself.
The findings on the consequences and origins of women’s rights suggest that
causality between economic development and women’s rights runs in both di-
rections. We conclude our survey by discussing the theory of Doepke and Tertilt
(2009), which captures the feedback between economics and politics in a model
where human-capital driven growth and the expansion of women’s rights mutu-
ally reinforce each other. In the model, men initially have all the power, but they
can vote to endow women with economic rights that give them more bargaining
power in marriage. As voters, men face a tradeoff between the bargaining power
of their own wife (which they would prefer to be low) and the bargaining power
of other men’s wives (which they would prefer to be high). There are two differ-
ent reasons why men would like women other than their own wife to have power.
First, since women attach more weight to the future well-being of their children,
empowering women leads to faster human capital accumulation. Men benefit
from a general rise in education, because education levels under patriarchy are
inefficiently low. Second, men more specifically would like their own daughters
to have rights, so as to protect them from exploitation by their husbands. Doepke
and Tertilt show that men’s incentives to support women’s rights depends on
5The seminal work by Boserup (1997) is the first economic analysis of how the position of
women changes with development. However, Boserup does not deal with the political economy
of women’s legal rights, which is our focus here.
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the return to education. Thus, technological change that increases the demand
for human capital can endogenously trigger female empowerment. Conversely,
once women have rights human capital accumulation speeds up even more, im-
plying that political change feeds back into economic development.
In the next section we give an overview of the basic facts on women’s rights
across countries and throughout history. In Section 3, we discuss the economic
consequences of various forms of women’s rights. Section 4 takes a political-
economy perspective to analyze the driving forces behind changes in women’s
rights. In Section 5, we review the theory of Doepke and Tertilt (2009), where
skill-biased technical change drives both economic development and the expan-
sion of women’s rights. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Facts
In this section, we illustrate the wide heterogeneity in women’s legal rights around
the world, documenting the close association between women’s empowerment
and economic development. We start with a cross-country comparison and then
move to a brief historical description for two countries—England and the United
States.
2.1 Women’s Rights Across Countries
There is tremendous variation in women’s legal rights across countries. On the
whole, contemporary data support the notion of a strong link between women’s
rights and development.
Figure I shows a scatter plot of the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM; an in-
dex constructed by the United Nations Development Programme) and GDP per
capita across countries.6 The correlation coefficient of 0.8 suggests a strong con-
nection between women’s rights and economic development. The GEM is a mix-
ture of legal rights and economic outcomes for women. Given our emphasis on
6See Appendix A.1 for a detailed data description.
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Figure I: Female Empowerment and Economic Development Across Countries
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formal rights, in Table 1 we display several measures of female empowerment
that capture the concept of legal rights more closely. The table gives average val-
ues for four groups of countries based on income and also includes the United
States as a benchmark. We list values for individual countries in Table 4 in the
Appendix.
The table contains several measures of property rights. A value of one means
that women have full property rights, while a zero means they do not. The data
show that women in high income countries have almost equal access to land,
property, and credit as men, while women in many low income countries are
excluded. The relationship between women’s property rights and development
is also apparent in Figure II, which plots women’s access to land relative to GDP
per capita. In all countries with a per capita income of $20,000 or above (with the
exception of Israel) women have equal access to land, while most low-income
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Figure II: Access to Land and Economic Development Across Countries
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countries cluster on the lower left-hand corner of the graph.
Many countries have laws related to women’s role in the family. For example,
parental authority is a measure of child custody rules, normalized such that a low
value means that mothers do not have the same authority as fathers. As Figure III
shows, parental authority is equal for fathers and mothers in essentially all high
income countries, while in low income countries parental authority is mostly in
the hands of men. Inheritance discrimination is a variable that measures whether
there is a gender-bias in inheritance practices, ranging from 0 (no gender bias) to 1
(males are favored). The data show that sons are strongly favored over daughters
in low income countries, somewhat favored in middle-income countries, while
there is no distinction between sons and daughters in the United States. Repudia-
tion relates to divorce law. A high number means that husbands can unilaterally
cancel the marriage contract, which leaves women without any protection in di-
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Figure III: Equality in Child Custody and Economic Development Across Coun-
tries
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vorce. A low number means that repudiation is not allowed. Again, we see that
repudiation is common in low-income countries, while essentially non-existent
in high income countries.7 Another variable related to marriage law is polygyny.
A high number means polygyny is a legally (or socially) acceptable practice while
a low number means it is not. While the (non-)acceptability of polygyny is not
exactly a right for women, a marriage law that allows polygyny establishes an
asymmetry between men and women, since in those same countries polyandry
is typically not allowed.8 The data show that the acceptability of polygyny de-
creases with income and is non-existent in high income countries.9
7The only high-income countries that allow repudiation are Bahrain and the United Arab Emi-
rates.
8Polyandry means the practice of women marrying multiple men.
9There are a few exceptions in the Middle East: Bahrain, Kuwait, U.A.E., and Israel.
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Figure IV: Contraceptive Prevalence and Economic Development Across Coun-
tries
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How much control do women have over their own body? High income countries
have strict laws against rape and domestic violence, thereby granting women es-
sentially full control over themselves. This is not the case in all parts of the world.
The variable violence in the table is a summary index of legislation punishing acts
of violence against women, including rape, domestic violence, and sexual ha-
rassment. The value for low income countries is about twice as high as for high
income countries, showing that the protection from violence is much weaker in
poor countries. A specific type of violence against the female body is the prac-
tice of female genital mutilation (FGM), which essentially exists only in low income
countries. The freedom of movement is also severely restricted in poor countries.
Similarly, in many poor countries women are obliged to wear a veil. Also related
to control over one’s own body is access to contraception. Since data on the le-
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gality and availability of different forms of contraception is difficult to obtain,
the table simply shows the percentage of women using modern methods of birth
control.10 The strong positive correlation between contraceptive prevalence and
economic development is illustrated in Figure IV.
Finally, consider political rights. Suffrage (i.e. the right to vote and to run for
public office) was extended much earlier in high income countries: the median
year of women suffrage was 1919 in high income countries, compared to 1957
in low income countries. Another measure related to the political process (even
though not directly a right) is the percentage of seats in parliament that are held
by women. Even if women’s share is far from equal to men’s share in most coun-
tries, high income countries exhibit a higher share (21.3 percent) compared to the
rest of the world. Interestingly, the slope of both indicators with respect to in-
come is not very steep, in particular when moving from middle income to low
income countries.
2.2 The History of Women’s Rights in England and the United
States
The legal position of American and English women changed dramatically over
the last two centuries. We discuss these two countries together because the evo-
lution of rights is remarkably parallel. The initial situation was also similar, as the
legal system in both countries is grounded in the common law (with exceptions
in a few U.S. states that were initially colonized by Spain or France).
The changes to women’s rights over the last 200 years can be grouped into three
phases. During the second half of the nineteenth century, women gained eco-
nomic rights related to property, child custody, and divorce. During the early
twentieth century, political rights were extended to women. Finally, women
gained full equality in the labor market and improved rights over their own body.
10In some developing countries, access to contraceptives may be limited not only by low avail-
ability, but also by legal and customary restrictions, that force women to seek their husband
consent to access family planing services (e.g. Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2010)).
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Table 1: Women’s Rights Across Countries by Income Group
Measure of Women’s Rights Upper- Lower-
High middle middle Low
income income income income
U.S. countries countries countries countries
Property Rights
Women’s access to land 1 0.92 0.83 0.79 0.30
Women’s access to bank loans 1 0.98 0.92 0.85 0.55
Women’s access to property 1 0.98 0.93 0.89 0.52
Family Law
Repudiation 0 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.28
Polygyny 0 0.11 0.18 0.25 0.67
Parental authority 1 0.89 0.74 0.75 0.26
Inheritance discrimination 0 0.12 0.28 0.29 0.67
Rights Related to a Woman’s Own Body
Female genital mutilation 0 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.32
Violence against women 0.33 0.35 0.50 0.50 0.66
Freedom of movement 0 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.12
Obligation to wear a veil in public 0 0.04 0.15 0.15 0.18
Contraceptive prevalence (%) 76.4 70.8 52.9 57.3 28.1
Political Rights
Median year of suffrage 1920 1919 1946 1944 1957
Women in parliament (%) 15 21.3 15.1 14.0 13.0
Gender Empowerment Measure 0.76 0.68 0.54 0.44 0.33
Sources and Variable Descriptions: see Appendix A.1.
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Tables 2 and 3 list the most important milestones for the United States and Eng-
land.
Up until the nineteenth century, under the common law women lost their legal
identity upon marriage: they could not hold property or land in their own name,
write wills or contracts, nor did they have legal control over their own children.
The legal rights of husband and wife were merged upon marriage and exercised
exclusively by the husband (Hecker 1971). One of the earliest changes in the legal
position of married women concerned child custody rules. In 1838 Iowa was
the fist U.S. state that permitted custody to mothers, with other states following
shortly thereafter (Mason 1994). In England, the Custody of Infants Act passed
in 1839, and gave mothers the possibility of custody for children below seven
years of age. After several further reforms, by the end of the nineteenth century
women could be awarded custody of all minor children in case of divorce.
Divorce laws were also relaxed (and made more symmetric) during the nine-
teenth century. A key step was the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act in England.
In the United States, by the end of the century divorce was allowed on grounds
of cruelty in almost all states (Griswold 1986). Another key area of reform con-
cerned marital property law. Maine was the first state that passed a law to allow
married women to own separate property in their own name in 1844. By the end
of the century, all married American women had access to some form of property
and earnings protection (Khan 1996). In England, the Married Women’s Property
Act was passed in 1870 and expanded in 1874 and 1882, giving English women
control over their own earnings and property (Combs 2005; Holcombe 1983).
By 1900, the initial phase of expanding women’s economic rights was complete,
yet women still lacked most political rights. The women’s suffrage movements
began to emerge during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the United
States, a handful of Western states already granted women’s suffrage during the
nineteenth century, starting with Wyoming (1869) and Utah (1870). However, in
the majority of states the enfranchisement of women followed only after the nine-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which granted full voting
rights to women in 1920 (Braun and Kvasnicka 2010). Similarly, British women
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gained partial suffrage through the Representation of the People Act of 1918.11 In
the same year, all women over 21 years old were granted the right to stand for
Parliament through The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act. Equal voting
rights with men were only achieved through the Representation of the People
Acts of 1928, also known as the Equal Franchise Act, which granted universal
suffrage to women over age 21.12
Even by the mid-twentieth century, women had not gained legal rights equal to
men along all dimensions. In particular, women continued to face unequal le-
gal treatment in the labor market long after they had gained the right to vote.
In the United States, restrictions on hours worked, wages, and work conditions
of female employees were introduced in almost all states during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, typically disguised as protective legislation
(Goldin 1990, Chapter 7). For example, women were not allowed to work night
shifts, yet night shift experience was required to move up the career ladder (Hu-
ber 1976). Similarly, marriage bars, which excluded married women from certain
occupations such as clerical work and teaching, were common until World War II.
Legislations that promoted equal treatment in the labor market was introduced
during the second half of the twentieth century: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in
the United States and the Equal Pay Act of 1970 in the England. Thus, equality
in the labor market was achieved relatively late, and indeed, to the extent that
gender discrimination is still an issue of public debate today, the focus is usually
on equality in the labor market.
The twentieth century also saw an expansion of women’s control over their body.
Until 1976, marital rape was legal in every state in the United States. Although
by now marital rape is a crime everywhere, some states still do not consider it
as serious as other forms of rape. Access to birth control was initially severely
restricted. In the United States, the Comstock Act of 1873 outlawed the dissemi-
nation of birth control devices or information through the mail. By the 1950s and
1960s, most states had legalized birth control, but many state laws still prohib-
ited the dissemination of information about contraception, and some states still
11The act gave the right to vote to women over the age of 30 who met minimum property
qualifications.
12Acts available at http://www.parliament.uk.
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prohibited the possession of contraception. A 1965 Supreme Court decision lim-
ited states’ ability to restrict access to birth control (Griswold v. Connecticut). Of
course, technological change was also important for expanding access, in partic-
ular through the introduction of the birth control pill. In the United States, the
Food and Drugs Administration approved the pill in 1960. However, until the
end of the 1960s it could not be prescribed to single women below the age of ma-
jority without parental consent. The early 1970s saw a liberalization of abortion
with the lifting of abortion bans in all states by 1973 as a result of the Supreme
Court decision in the Roe v. Wade case (Goldin and Katz 2002).
Another area of reform in the United States during the 1970s concerned the al-
location of assets upon divorce. Most U.S. states were originally based on the
British common law system, where upon divorce assets were awarded to the
spouse who held the formal title. Only eight states, primarily those with a French
or Spanish colonial legacy, had a community property system, in which assets
were divided equally. The distribution of property rights over marital assets
became a relevant issue as divorce laws were liberalized and divorce rates in-
creased in the second half of the twentieth century. In 1970, the Federal Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act provided guidelines for title-based states for adopt-
ing equitable distribution of property, in order to grant women a larger share of
assets in divorce settlements (Golden 1983).13 The last title-based state to intro-
duce equitable distribution of property was Mississippi in 1994 (American Bar
Association 1977-2005).
3 Economic Consequences of Extending Rights toWo-
men
In this section, we discuss the economic consequences of the expansion of wo-
men’s rights. One first-order effect is to redistribute resources (property, earn-
ings, decision power) from men to women in the household, in the labor market,
13In equitable distribution regimes, assets are divided by courts, irrespectively of the title to the
property, to achieve equity.
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Table 2: United States Timeline
1769 “The very being and legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage...”
(from English common law)
1785 Pennsylvania was the first state to pass a statue that allowed both men and women to file
for divorce under extreme circumstances (desertion of at least four years, bigamy, sexual
incapacity before marriage, and cruelty). Other states followed shortly.
1838 Kentucky gave school suffrage (the right to vote at school meetings) to widows with children of
school age.
1838 Iowa was first state to allow sole custody of a child to its mother in the event of a divorce.
1839 Mississippi was the first state that gave married women limited property rights.
1844 Maine passed Sole Trader Law which granted married women the ability to engage in business
without the need for her husband’s consent. Maine also passed a Property Law that granted
married women separate control over property.
1857 Maine passed an Earnings Law which granted married women the rights to their own earnings.
1861 Kansas gave school suffrage to all women. Many states followed before the turn of the
century.
1869 Wyoming was the first state that gave women the same voting rights as men.
Most states did not follow until the beginning of the twentieth century.
1886 All but six states allowed divorce on grounds of cruelty.
1895 Almost all states have passed some form of Sole Trader Laws, Property Laws,
and Earnings Laws.
1920 Nineteenth amendment granting all women right to vote.
1965 Weeks vs. Southern Bell: many restrictive labor laws were lifted, opening previously
male-only jobs to women.
1970 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act promotes equitable distribution of property
1973 Roe v. Wade: legalization of abortion.
1974 Credit discrimination against women outlawed by Congress.
1975 States are denied the right to exclude women from juries.
1981 The Supreme Court rules that excluding women from the draft is unconstitutional.
Sources: Hecker (1971), Salmon (1986), and Khan (1996).
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Table 3: England Timeline
Until Stark disparity between legal rights of married vs. single women. Single women were considered
1850 feme sole which allowed them the right to make contracts and own property in their own name.
Married women were legally considered feme covert which meant that upon marriage the legal
rights of the woman merged and became that of her husband. Married women had practically no
rights regarding property, child custody, or the ability to make contracts.
1839 Custody of Infants Act, which for the first time granted mothers (under special circumstances)
custody of children under 7 years in the event of divorce.
1857 Matrimonial Causes Act, which permitted secular divorce in England, allowing both men and
women to file. Note though that this law allowed men to file on grounds of adultery, while women
could initiate a divorce only if adultery was coupled with incest, bigamy, cruelty, or desertion.
This act also gave divorced women the status of feme sole.
1869 England granted municipal suffrage to single women and widows.
1870 Act to provide public elementary education in England and Wales. This act created school boards and
gave women school suffrage.
1870 The Married Women Property Act granted women limited control over their earnings and modest
legacies. This act did not give women the same property rights as men, rather it was intended to
protect the most vulnerable women from their husband’s exploitation.
1873 2nd Custody of Infants Act which allowed mothers to petition for custody of children up to 16 yrs. old.
1878 The Matrimonial Causes Act allowed courts to absolve a wife from her obligation to co-habit and
to require her husband to pay a weekly sum to support her, if he had been convicted of aggravated
assault against her and she was considered in further danger.
1882 The Act to Consolidate and amend Acts relating to the Property of Married Women gave women
the ability to hold separate property and to contract with respect to their separate estates.
1886 The Married Women Act allowed maintenance orders to be issued against men who neglected,
willfully refused to support, or deserted their wives.
1888 County Suffrage
1894 Parish and District Suffrage gave both single and married women the right to elect and be elected
to parish and district councils.
1907 England made women eligible as mayors, aldermen, an county and town councilors.
1918 The Representation of the People Act give women the right to vote provided they are aged over 30
and either they, or their husband, meet a property qualification.
1918 The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act allows women to stand for Parliament
1928 The Equal Franchise Act is passed giving women equal voting rights with men.
1935 Act passed that secured a married women’s right to assume personal liability for her contracts.
Source: based on Hecker (1971), Shanley (1986), Kertzer and Barbagli (2001) and the British Par-
liament archives (available at http://www.parliament.uk).
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or on the ballot. Granting property rights to women also removes inefficiencies in
their economic behavior and increases the scope for investment in their human
capital. Women’s political rights (as voters and as representatives) have been
shown to have a substantial impact on policy outcomes and favor the public pro-
vision of goods, in particular in health and education. Below, we summarize a
number of empirical and theoretical studies that have examined the implications
of extending economic and political rights to women.
3.1 Women’s Property Rights
In England, The Married Women’s Property Act of 1870 greatly expanded wo-
men’s control over personal property within marriage.14 In response, women
shifted the composition of their portfolios from real property (such as a cottage)
to more personal property (such as money and furniture). However, no differ-
ence was observed in their total assets holdings (Combs 2005), possibly because
of their limited earning possibilities. The extension of economic rights also had
an effect on the economic lives of women living in the United States. Like in
England, the immediate impact was limited by the relatively low participation of
women in the labor market during the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, patent
data from 1790 to 1895 reveal that granting economic rights to women, in par-
ticular rights that gave them the ability to own and operate a business without
their husband’s permission or oversight, led to more patenting by female inven-
tors, especially in urban areas (Khan 1996). Similarly, between 1850 and 1920,
the relative investment in the human capital of women increased in those states
where they had gained property and earning rights (Geddes, Lueck, and Ten-
nyson 2009). However, there is no evidence that the expansion of economic rights
had any significant impact on female labor force participation, at least between
1860 and 1900 (Roberts 2006).
In more recent decades, women’s property rights over marital assets upon di-
vorce had a seizable impact on household behavior in the United States.15 For
14Even prior to the Property Act, women had some control over their real assets.
15See Hamilton (1999) for an analysis of wives’ property rights over marital assets in Que´bec
during the nineteenth century.
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married couples such rights influence the outside option in marital bargaining,
and can thus affect the intra-household allocation.16 Community property regimes,
which often award more resources to women upon divorce than title-based regimes,
are associated with lower hours of work by women and higher by men (Chiap-
pori, Fortin, and Lacroix 2002). In the 1970s and 1980s, the elimination of the
title-based system brought an increase in the amount of assets awarded to wo-
men. However, equal division of property may not always grant more assets to
women, or to secondary earners more generally, compared with separate prop-
erty.Women who consume as much as their husband in marriage, but have lower
permanent income, may be better off in a separate property system, in which they
can accumulate more savings than their husband to avoid a drop in consumption
upon divorce. Equal division of property may also generate a distortion in the in-
centives to accumulate assets during marriage, since it prevents spouses to save
proportionally to their consumption in marriage. Enforceable prenuptial agree-
ments may be better suited at facilitating consumption smoothing upon divorce,
especially for women (Voena 2011).
In developing countries, where agriculture usually accounts for a large share of
output, gender disparities in access to land and in the security of land property
pose particular challenges (Joireman 2008, The World Bank 2012). From a theoret-
ical viewpoint, we would expect the lack of secure property rights to negatively
affect the incentives to invest (Besley 1995). Indeed, Zimbabwean women are less
likely than men to invest in tree planting when their property rights are insecure
due to likely changes in their marital status. However, they are as likely as men
to plant when their land tenure is secure (Fortman, Antinori, and Nobane 1997).
The lack of well-defined property rights for women is a substantial barrier to effi-
cient agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa. Udry (1996) showed that the
profitability of land is lower for wives than for husbands. Goldstein and Udry
(2008) suggest that lower profitability may be due to the land tenure system. Fear
16Allocations are also affected by laws that govern the circumstances under which divorce is
allowed. In the United States, the introduction of unilateral divorce, which allows one spouse
to obtain divorce without the consent of the other, was associated with a significant reduction in
rates of domestic violence and female suicide (Stevenson and Wolfers 2006), and with changes in
the labor supply of women (although evidence on labor supply is not conclusive, see Gray 1998
and Stevenson 2008). Eswaran and Malhotra (2011), in contrast, find that more female autonomy
increases domestic violence in India, as men use violence to increase their bargaining power.
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of expropriation, which is more likely for women, leads them to be less likely to
let their land fallow and thus negatively affects the productivity of their plots.
Access to secure property rights may also influence women’s bargaining posi-
tion within their marriage. For instance, land property for women in Nepal is
associated with greater intrahousehold empowerment of wives and better health
outcomes for the children (Allendorf 2007). Examining a land titling program in
Peru which explicitly targeted gender equality in land ownership, Field (2003)
establishes a causal relationship between land rights, female empowerment, and
lower fertility. Women who became more likely to appear as owners on property
documents as a result of the program were more likely to participate in house-
hold decision-making and significantly less likely to give birth.17
Summing up, the evidence from a variety of contexts seems to suggest that more
property rights for women lead to higher investment, both in physical and hu-
man capital, as well a lower fertility.
3.2 Women’s Political Rights
Empirical evidence indicates that extending the suffrage to women affected leg-
islative behavior, which is what a model of electoral competition would predict.
Female suffrage seems to have shifted public spending towards welfare pro-
grams and public health. In the United States, the enfranchisement of women
was associated with a 24 percent increase in state social spending, and in partic-
ular with higher local public health spending. Other types of public spending
did not respond to women suffrage. Female suffrage was also associated with
an 8 to 15 percent decline in child mortality (Miller 2008). Further empirical evi-
dence suggests that not only the composition, but also the total amount of public
spending was affected: suffrage coincided with more liberal voting patterns and
an increase in government expenditures (Lott and Kenny 1999). A similar pat-
tern has been observed in six Western European countries between 1869 and 1960
(Aidt and Dallal 2008). Abrams and Settle (1999) use OECD data between 1960
17Not only different preferences for children, but also difference in the opportunity cost of
childbearing may explain why empowering women can reduce fertility (Iyigun and Walsh 2007).
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and 1992 to examine the impact of Switzerland’s extension of the franchise to
women in 1971. They document a 28 percent increase in social welfare spending
with respect to other neighboring countries which had already granted women’s
suffrage. More recently, Funk and Gathmann (2008) examine survey data on all
federal votes in Switzerland between 1981 and 2003, where voters make direct
decisions on a broad range of issues two to three times a year. They find only
limited evidence that women favor a larger government, but female voters and
politicians have a substantial impact on the composition of public spending, fa-
voring public health provision, equal gender rights, environmental protection,
and unemployment and social security provisions rather than nuclear energy
and the military.
Why do women vote differently from men? One argument is that women have
intrinsically different preferences, and in particular care more about children and
public health and less about defense than men. A different argument is that wo-
men face different economic conditions than men, such as lower incomes and
higher financial vulnerability. As a result of these different circumstances, wo-
men may demand more public welfare programs. The enfranchisement of wo-
men would then increase public spending: as the income of the decisive voter
falls relative to the mean, she supports more governmental redistribution (Abrams
and Settle 1999). Edlund and Pande (2002) examine the impact of changes in
divorce laws, the rise in single motherhood, and female poverty in the United
States and find evidence that supports the hypothesis that the political gender
gap responds to changes in the economic gender gap.18
Other evidence on women’s political rights comes from natural experiments that
instituted quotas for female politicians. In most countries, women occupy only
a small fraction of legislative positions and are generally less likely to partici-
pate in politics (The World Bank 2012).19 Gender quotas have been introduced in
some countries to expand female presence in politics. The majority of empirical
evidence on the impact of gender quotas comes from India, where the specific
18See also Edlund, Haider, and Pande (2005) for an analysis of this hypothesis in Europe.
19Lower access to education does not appear to explain the lower involvement of Kenyan wo-
men in community participation, although it increases their political knowledge (Friedman et al.
2011).
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design of the program allows for causal inference.20 Exploiting random varia-
tion in reserved and unreserved seats, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that
female Village Council heads in West Bengal and Rajasthan favor spending on
infrastructure that is relevant for women in their community.21 Data on state leg-
islators indicate that in the United States female policymakers affect the compo-
sition of public spending as well: more women in state governments contributed
to the rise in health care spending as well as a decreased growth rate on prison
spending (Rehavi 2007). However, data from U.S. city mayor elections suggests
that women’s impact may not be as relevant in local governments (Ferreira and
Gyourko 2010).
3.3 Women’s Rights Over Their Body
The twentieth century also saw fundamental changes that gave women greater
control over their body and their lives. Legal access to oral contraceptives gave
women control over the timing of childbearing, and thus their labor market par-
ticipation (Bailey 2006) and their access to professional careers (Goldin and Katz
2002). Access to contraceptives can also improve women’s intrahousehold bar-
gaining position (Chiappori and Oreffice 2008). In fact, data from Europe sug-
gests that allowing abortion and oral contraceptives increased women’s self-reported
life satisfaction (Pezzini 2005).22 In some developing countries, access to contra-
ceptives may be limited not only by low availability, but also by spousal discor-
dance in the demand for children and husband consent requirements. Ashraf,
20For a comprehensive review on gender quotas, see Pande and Ford (2011).
21Exposure to quotas seems to also reduce voters’ gender bias and lead to greater likelihood of
the election of a female policymaker after reservations are removed (Beaman et al. 2008). Other
evidence on female representatives in India uses variation due to close elections and indicates
that the impact of women policymakers is closely tied to their caste (Clots-Figueras 2007) and has
only limited impact on education policy (Clots-Figueras 2011).
22Access to contraceptive and to abortion may not always increase the well-being of women.
Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) suggest that the availability of such technologies may have
eroded the bargaining power of some women, who remained pregnant out-of-wedlock, and thus
decreased the frequency of shotgun marriages, and increased poverty among women. More gen-
erally, it is interesting to point out that the overall self-reported satisfaction of women has been
consistently declining both in absolute terms and relative to men since the 1970s (Stevenson and
Wolfers 2009).
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Field, and Lee (2010) found that Zambian women who were offered family plan-
ning services alone were significantly more likely to use them compared to wo-
men who were offered the same services in the presence of their husband.
More rights over their own body likely led to other changes beyond women’s
reproductive choices. In a theoretical paper, Tertilt (2006) analyzes the impact of
giving women property rights over their own body in the context of polygyny
in Africa. The analysis shows that allowing women to make their own marriage
decisions (in contrast to fathers owning daughters and selling them to future
husbands) leads to an increase in savings, a decrease in fertility, and thereby to
higher output per capita.23 The reason is that self-ownership of women decreases
the returns on daughters for men, who start investing more in physical capital
and less into acquiring wives and large families.24
4 Political Origins of Expanding Women’s Rights
We now turn to the political economy of women’s rights. Why did legislators
and voters, all of whom were male until female suffrage was introduced, decide
to empower women? And what explains the timing of the reforms?
4.1 Cultural Explanations
Traditionally, the spread of women’s rights has been mostly attributed to cultural
changes. For example, historians emphasize the role of the women’s movement
in changing attitudes about gender equality and ultimately convincing legisla-
tors to support women’s rights.25 From this perspective, women’s rights have
been grouped with a general trend towards more rights for various groups in
society, including the abolition of slavery, rights for gay people, and even animal
23See also Tertilt (2005) for an economic analysis of polygyny.
24Similarly, requiring the consent of the marrying individual to the marriage, and not only
the consent of his family, favors younger generations and may increase investment (Edlund and
Lagerlo¨f 2006).
25See, for example, Keyssar (2000).
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rights. These cultural changes, in turn, have been argued to be rooted in the Age
of Enlightenment, which emphasized equality among people. However, not all
Enlightenment philosophers agreed that equality should extend to equality be-
tween the sexes. While some favored female emancipation, many others, such as
Kant and Rousseau, remained strongly opposed.26
Once considered beyond the realm of economics, cultural change has recently
become an area of active economic research. One caveat is that this literature
concentrates on the impact of culture on economic choices (such as female labor
force participation) and the evolution of culture itself; in contrast, it does not
deal explicitly with women’s legal rights and the political-economy implications
of cultural change.27 Nevertheless, recent findings in the economics of culture
suggest pathways through which cultural changes may have promoted political
reform.
Several recent papers empirically assess the importance of culture using data
from second-generation immigrants in the United States (Antecol 2000; Ferna´ndez
and Fogli 2009; Alesina and Giuliano 2010). The main finding is that the choices
of second-generation Americans concerning fertility and female labor supply are
correlated with average fertility and labor-force participation rates in their coun-
tries of origin. Since second-generation Americans face the same economic con-
ditions and circumstances as other Americans, these findings are interpreted as
evidence for a cultural transmission of preferences. For example, the parent gen-
eration (i.e., the immigrants) may have formed cultural attitudes about family
size or traditional gender roles while growing up in the home country, and then
passed on the same views to their American-born children. There is also evidence
for a transmission of preferences via television. Chong, Duryea, and La Ferrara
(2008) finds that exposure to soap operas in Brazil led to a decrease in fertil-
ity. Similarly, Oster and Jensen (2009) show how attitudes about the status of
women changed with the arrival of cable television in rural India: the reported
acceptability of domestic violence declined, reported son preference and fertility
26For example, Kant and Rousseau argued that women should not be educated. On the other
hand, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet was an early advocate for wo-
men’s suffrage in his essay Sur l’admission des femmes au droit de cite´, published in 1790.
27One exception is Givati and Troiano (2011), who examine how cultural attitudes towards
gender-based discrimination influence optimal maternity leave policy.
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declined as well, and women’s autonomy went up.
A number of theoretical papers develop explicit models of the transmission of
culture. In Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), attitudes towards women’s
work are formed in childhood. Men who grow up with a working mother are
more likely to marry a woman who remains in the labor force. Fogli and Veld-
kamp (2011) model culture as endogenously changing beliefs. Specifically, beliefs
about the impact of working mothers on their children’s success evolve as more
information becomes available. The more women participate in the labor force,
the faster beliefs change as the information content of observing one’s peers in-
creases. This evolution of beliefs leads to an S-shaped increase in female labor
force participation.28
The evidence on evolving attitudes towards women’s role in society suggest that
cultural change may have contributed to political reform, by changing legisla-
tors’ and voters’ views about the society they want to live in. However, this does
not imply that cultural change is a deep driving force of political change by itself:
the important question is why culture changed when it did. To this end, there is
evidence that cultural norms often have economic origins. For example, Miguel
(2005) relates the culture of witch killing in Tanzania to poverty. Using varia-
tion in rainfall as an instrument for poverty, he documents that witch killing was
more prevalent in areas where lack of rainfall led to starvation. Hence, killing
women (and calling them witches) may have evolved as a solution to a severe
economic problem.29 Cheung (1972) suggests that the tradition of foot binding
in China (which results in crippled feet) was a way to establish property rights
over daughters. Young girls were often relied on for weaving and spinning in
the household. Bossen et al. (2011) argue that foot binding disappeared when the
arrival of commercial cloths made the home production of these products unprof-
itable, which once again links cultural change to technological change. Alesina,
Giuliano, and Nunn (2011a, 2011b) find that current cross-country variation in at-
titudes towards gender roles is related to historical agricultural practices, namely
the extent to which agriculture was plough-based (for which male strength was
important) versus hoe-based (which women could easily do). Finally, Green-
28A related point is also made by Ferna´ndez (2007).
29Oster (2004) makes a similar point in the context of Renaissance Europe.
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wood and Guner (2009, 2010) argue that technological progress in home pro-
duction and birth control technology led to, respectively, falling marriage and
divorce rates and more liberal attitudes towards premarital sex.
In sum, one interpretation of the evidence on culture is that the ultimate cause
of political reform was economic change that altered attitudes towards women.
However, attitudes are a slow-moving variable, and cultural transmission may
have been important for the economic changes to reach their full effect, perhaps
with a considerable lag. Of course, this still leaves open the question exactly
which kind of economic changes were responsible for changing attitudes towards
women’s rights, which is what we turn to next.
4.2 Explanations Based on Technological Change
Several papers argue that technological change, broadly defined, was responsible
for the extension of economic rights to women during the nineteenth century
(Geddes and Lueck 2002; Doepke and Tertilt 2009; Ferna´ndez 2009). Geddes and
Lueck (2002) tie the expansion of rights to increasing labor market opportunities
for women. Even though husbands initially had all legal power, they were unable
to control how much effort their wives choose to exert at work. When women
had no rights, effort provision was inefficiently low. By endowing their wives
with economic rights, husbands were able to induce their wives to put in more
effort, leading to larger family incomes. In essence, men faced a tradeoff between
getting a larger share of a smaller pie or a smaller share of a larger pie. This
tradeoff shifted as women’s labor market opportunities improved. One caveat
for applying this logic to the nineteenth-century reforms is that married women’s
labor force participation was very low at the time and did not increase when
economic rights were expanded.30 However, the mechanism may be relevant
for improvements in women’s access to the labor market that took place in the
twentieth century.
Whereas in Geddes and Lueck (2002) men’s motivation is simply to maximize
30Moreover, there is no correlation between female labor force participation rates and women’s
rights in cross state data (Roberts 2006).
25
their consumption, in Doepke and Tertilt (2009) and Ferna´ndez (2009) men’s po-
litical preferences are driven by concern for their daughters. The mechanism in
Doepke and Tertilt (2009) relates to women’s role in the education of children
rather than the labor market. By empowering women, men can improve the wel-
fare of their daughters (at the expense of the sons-in-law) and ensure a better
education for their grandchildren. These motives become more important when
the return to human capital increases over time.31 Ferna´ndez (2009) proposes a
related theory where fertility decline is the ultimate driving force of women’s
rights. As in Doepke and Tertilt (2009), men have conflicting interests in their
role as husbands and fathers. As fertility declines, fathers desire to leave larger
bequests to each child. However, without female rights, bequests to daughters
are essentially confiscated by the sons-in-law. This problem increases in the size
of the desired bequest and is thus exacerbated by declining fertility as well as
increasing wealth. Thus, the process of development that triggered the demo-
graphic transition and drove wealth accumulation may have also led men to
support economic rights for women.
Bertocchi (2011) examines the reasons for extending voting rights to women.
Once again, the argument is related to women’s role in the labor market. In
her model, people’s preferred tax rate is decreasing in income. Given that on
average women’s earnings are lower than those of men, including women in the
political decision process leads to an increase in taxes, which most men oppose.
However, as the gender wage gap declines (e.g. because of gender-biased tech-
nological progress), the gap between the tax rates preferred my male and female
voters declines. If there is a societal cost of excluding women from the franchise,
men will voluntarily give women voting rights once the tax gap is sufficiently
small.
One way to test the various political-economy explanations for changing wo-
men’s rights is to identify groups that historically were in favor of the expansion
of women’s rights. Some evidence of this kind can be derived from cross-state
variation in the timing of changes in women’s rights in the United States. Ged-
des and Lueck (2002) find that states with larger city populations, more female
31We will discuss this theory in more detail in Section 5.
26
schooling, and higher per capita wealth granted property rights to women ear-
lier. In addition, Ferna´ndez (2009) finds that states with low fertility rates were
also quick to expand women’s rights.
Jones (1991) analyzes data on voting behavior in the U.S. House and Senate on
female suffrage during the nineteenth century. She finds that the sex ratio played
a large role: representatives from states with a large majority of men were more
inclined to vote for suffrage than those with a more balanced sex ratio. Similarly,
Braun and Kvasnicka (2010) argue that unbalanced sex ratios explain why West-
ern states were the first to grant female suffrage. Giving women the right to vote
was less costly for men in states where they were the majority, and it was hoped
that suffrage would attract more women to the West. Jones (1991) establishes
a link between prohibition and female suffrage. Those states where the liquor
industry was particularly powerful were more opposed to women suffrage (wo-
men were more supportive of prohibition).32 While interesting, large variation in
sex ratios as well as the connection to prohibition are specific to the U.S. context.
At the individual level, the presence of daughters has been shown to have a fa-
vorable effect on the attitude of men towards women’s rights. This finding has
been documented among American legislators, but also in U.S., Canadian, and
British household surveys.33 This finding accords with the general notion that
concern about the next generation is what drives men to support women’s rights.
5 Feedback Between Economic and Political Change:
A Theory of Women’s Liberation
Taken together, the studies discussed so far suggest that causality between eco-
nomic development and women’s rights runs in both directions: women’s rights
32Similarly, Berman (1987) shows that in Arizona in 1912-1916 it was mostly farmers, mormons,
and western-born natives who favored prohibition, third party candidates, and women suffrage.
33See Washington (2008), Warner (1991), Warner and Steel (1999), and Oswald and Powdthavee
(2010). However, a recent study based on U.S. nationally representative data suggests that the
presence of female offspring may increase conservative political preferences among voters (Con-
ley and Rauscher 2010).
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affect choices that feed back into development, and economic development in
itself may be a key force driving the political expansion of women’s rights. To
examine this two-way relationship, we now discuss the theory of Doepke and
Tertilt (2009), where economic development and political change are mutually
reinforcing trends.
Doepke and Tertilt focus on the expansion of economic rights for married wo-
men during the nineteenth century in England and the United States. As de-
scribed in Section 2.2, these reforms took place before women gained the right to
vote. Thus, to explain why the reforms took place, one has to understand what
men stood to gain from expanding women’s rights. The argument laid out in
Doepke and Tertilt (2009) is that men face a tradeoff between the rights of their
own wife and those of other men’s wives. More legal rights for married women
improve their bargaining position in the household and thus increase the female
share of household consumption. Thus, from a man’s perspective, one’s own
wife should ideally not have any rights. At the same time, men also care about
their daughters, and therefore would like their daughters to have rights to pro-
tect them from exploitation by their husbands. Moreover, women attach a higher
weight to the well-being of children, which implies that more bargaining power
for women translates into higher education investments for children. Since men
prefer a higher level of education for their grandchildren than their sons-in-law,
this provides another motive for supporting women’s rights. Based on this trade-
off, Doepke and Tertilt argue that the ultimate cause of the expansion of women’s
rights is technological change that increased the return to education. If technol-
ogy is such that human capital is irrelevant, men prefer patriarchy. In contrast, in
a world with high returns to education men care greatly about the education of
their descendants, leading them to support women’s rights.
To illustrate this mechanism, we review the main model ingredients here. The
economy is populated by overlapping generations of men and women in each
period. There is random matching in the marriage market. Apart from gender,
people are homogeneous, implying that all couples are identical. Men and wo-
men derive utility from their own consumption, their spouses’ consumption, and
the number and well-being of their children. The preferences are summarized by
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the following recursive utility function, indexed by gender g ∈ {m, f}:
Ug(cg, c−g, n, U ′m, U
′
f ) = u(cg, c−g, n) + γg
(
U ′m + U
′
f
2
)
.
Here cg is own consumption, and c−g denotes the spouse’s consumption. Cou-
ples have equal numbers of sons and daughters. The number of boy-girl pairs is
denoted by n, and U ′m and U ′f represents the utility of sons and daughters. The
weight γg that people attach to the welfare of their children differs by gender. In
particular, women care more about children: γf > γm.
The couple faces a common budget constraint. Each spouse is endowed with
one unit of time, which can be used for working or raising and educating chil-
dren. For simplicity, it is assumed that only women raise children. Therefore,
men spend all their time working. Women, on the other hand, have to allocate
their time optimally between working tf and educating boys em and girls ef . In
addition to the education time, it takes φ units of time to raise a boy-girl pair. The
female time constraint is therefore given by:
tf + (φ+ em + ef )n ≤ 1.
The labor of both spouses as well as their human capital is combined by a house-
hold production function to produce consumption goods. The household budget
constraint for a family where the wife and husband have human capital Hm and
Hf is:
cm + cf = A(tfHf )
α(Hm)
1−α,
where 0 < α < 1.
The point of educating children is to increase their human capital. The human
capital production function depends on education time eg as well as the human
capital of the parents:
H ′g = max{1, (Beg)θHβfH1−βm },
where θ and B and are technology parameters that determine the return to edu-
cation and β specifies the relative importance of fathers’ versus mothers’ human
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capital. Notice that children always receive at least one unit of human capital
even if they are not educated. The interpretation is that people have basic pro-
ductive skills, such as physical strength, that do not depend on receiving formal
instruction. The presence of basic human capital implies that parents will not
educate their children if the return to education is sufficiently low.
Each couple chooses fertility, the time allocation, and the division of consump-
tion among the spouses. Given that men and women have different preferences
(regarding the allocation of consumption between them and the education of
the children), decisions must be made using some form of bargaining between
the spouses. Doepke and Tertilt assume that bargaining power depends on the
political regime, i.e., women’s legal rights. On the one extreme, when women
have no legal rights they also also don’t have bargaining power in the house-
hold. Hence, men make all decisions—the patriarchy regime. On the other ex-
treme, when women do have legal rights, they have better outside options and
thus they participate in household decision making. This case is modeled as co-
operative bargaining—the empowerment regime.34
The political regime is determined through a vote by the male population. Since
all men alive at a given time are identical, they agree on the preferred regime.
However, if there is technological change, different generations of men face dif-
ferent political incentives. From the perspective of a male voter, the tradeoff
is between higher own consumption (under patriarchy) and higher well-being
of daughters as well as faster accumulation of human capital (under empower-
ment).
Consider now what happens when, due to technological change, the return to
education increases over time. As long as the return is still low, parents prefer
not to educate their children, people only have basic human capital, and there
is no economic growth. In this situation men prefer patriarchy, since the gain
from sharing power with women is relatively small.35 Once the return to edu-
34More specifically, the patriarchy allocation maximizes the male value function only, while
the empowerment allocation maximizes the equally weighted sum of the female and male value
functions.
35Daughters would still benefit from the empowerment regime, but the human-capital channel
is absent.
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cation surpasses a certain threshold, parents will start to educate their children.
However, from a man’s perspective the speed of accumulation of human capital
is inefficiently low. One reason for this is an externality in the marriage market:
men do not internalize that their children’s human capital will also benefit their
children’s future spouses. This externality leads to under-investment in human
capital. A second channel is that given the structure of preferences, men disagree
with their sons-in-law about the optimal education of grandchildren. These fric-
tions do not matter as long as parents do not educate their children, but they
become increasingly severe as the return to education keeps increasing. At some
point, a second threshold is reached where men are willing to sacrifice some own
consumption in order to help their daughters and speed up the accumulation of
human capital. By voting for women’s rights men can achieve exactly that: they
have to share more resources with their wife, but they also provide more bar-
gaining power to all other women in the economy (including their daughters),
which leads to more investment in education. Once the empowerment regime is
adopted, the political reform feeds back into economic change: the growth rate
of output per capita increases due to faster human-capital accumulation.
Formally, Doepke and Tertilt show that a gradual increase in the return to educa-
tion θ leads to an endogenous transition from patriarchy to empowerment. The
first effect of a rise in θ is that education starts to increase and fertility starts to
fall. Ultimately, the return to education is sufficiently large for men to vote for
empowerment. After the empowerment is implemented, the trends towards low
fertility and more education accelerate even more.
According to the model, development (specifically, human capital accumulation)
is a prerequisite for women’s rights, because men are willing to give up patri-
archy only if the demand for human capital is high. In this sense, development
causes women’s rights. On the other hand, women’s rights lead to a further in-
crease in the growth rate of human capital and output. Thus, women’s rights
also cause development. In sum, economic development and political change
mutually reinforce each other.
Doepke and Tertilt also show that the predictions of the theory are consistent
with the timing of the expansion of women’s rights in England and the United
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States during the second half of the nineteenth century. The model implies that
women’s rights are first introduced during a phase of beginning mass education
and fertility decline. And indeed, in the United States the total fertility rate de-
clined from close to seven children at the beginning of the nineteenth century to
only about 2.5 children for women born around the turn of the twentieth century.
The elementary school enrollment rate increased dramatically over the same time
horizon, from less than 50 percent at the beginning of the century to essentially
100 percent by the end. The expansion of legal rights took place right in the
middle of these transitions. The picture for England is similar, with the main dif-
ference that fertility stayed high for the first half of the nineteenth century. When
the major legal reforms were carried out in the second half of the century, fertility
was falling fast and education levels were rapidly rising.
6 Conclusion
Less than two centuries ago, in England, the United States, and many other coun-
tries women had no legal existence separate from their husbands. Less than one
century ago, women had no political rights in most countries. Not even half a
century ago, even in the most developed countries women still faced severe dis-
crimination in many areas of life, including the labor market. Today, we observe
a high correlation between measures of women’s rights and GDP per capita—
women’s rights are still lacking in most of the poorest countries of the world.
In this survey, we have described the consequences of extending rights to wo-
men, in particular economic rights, political rights, and rights over their own
body. In addition to redistributing resources to women, expanding women’s eco-
nomic rights appears to favor investment. Similarly, the introduction of women’s
suffrage has shifted the composition of public spending towards spending re-
lated to health, education, and children. We have also examined the political ori-
gins of the expansion of women’s rights in high income countries. While cultural
changes may have played a role, we argue that the most promising explanation
is technological change that shifted voters’ and politicians’ incentives for sup-
porting women’s rights. In particular, in the theory of Doepke and Tertilt (2009)
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technological progress that increases the return to schooling increases men’s in-
centives to support women’s rights. This finding gives hope for the position of
women in today’s poorest countries: as these countries develop, extending rights
to women may happen naturally as a consequence of technological change that
raises the demand for human capital.
At the same time, women in today’s developing countries face a number of
unique challenges that were not present in the historical development process
of industrialized countries. For example, son preference appears to be more pro-
nounced in several Asian countries today than it ever was in Europe (Das Gupta
et al. 2003). This might be due to modern technologies such as amniocentesis
and ultrasound that allow early detection of a fetus’ gender, giving rise to se-
lective abortion. Accordingly, in countries such as China or India sex ratios of
recent birth cohorts are very skewed (Sen 1990). Even though one might think
that scarcity of women will eventually benefit them and lead to a higher appreci-
ation of daughters, so far no such shift in attitudes has been observed.36 Rather,
in some instances, scarcity of women seems to make women’s plight even worse,
for example through sex trafficking and bride kidnapping. To date, we still lack
a systematic empirical and economic analysis of these issues.
At a more general level, we also need a better understanding of the nature of
the gender asymmetries that underlie observed differences in behavior between
men and women. One possibility is that men and women have different hard-
wired preferences, for evolutionary reasons.37 Indeed a sizeable part of the exist-
ing literature is implicitly or explicitly based on the assumption of a preference
gap between men and women. However, a second possibility is that differences
in economic and legal circumstances lead women to act differently from men.
For example, if marital resources are not split evenly upon divorce, then women
might favor more social insurance than men do. Similarly, if women have little
36Edlund and Lee (2009) argue that the sex ratio has become less skewed in recent years in
South Korea as a response to development. Neelakantan and Tertilt (2008) show that a skewed
sex ratio at birth does not directly translate into scarcity in the marriage market, if spousal age
gaps and gender-specific mortality are taken into account. See also Anderson and Ray (2010) on
the topic of missing women.
37For example, women may have evolved to care relatively more about children because they
have a lower reproductive capacity then men, or because men face paternity uncertainty (Doepke
and Tertilt 2009).
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access to savings technologies, they may invest more in children to insure their
old age consumption. As Doepke and Tertilt (2011) show, distinguishing these
explanations for gender differences in behavior is difficult. For example, endoge-
nous specialization in household production may lead women to act as if they
cared more about children, even when the true preferences of men and women
are symmetric.
In summary, this survey shows that substantial progress has been made in under-
standing the causes and consequences of the expansion of women’s rights. Yet,
many open question remain. Most importantly, more empirical and theoretical
research is needed to identify the precise mechanisms underlying the economics
of women’s rights and to analyze the specific challenges surrounding the expan-
sion of women’s rights in developing countries.
A Cross Country Data
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
A.1 Data Description
With the exception of women suffrage, all data is from the OECD Gender, Insti-
tutions and Development Data Base (GID 2006). Here we give the definition of
each variable and its original source.
Gender Empowerment Measure: measures inequality between men’s and wo-
men’s opportunities, combining measures of inequality in political participation
and decision making, in economic participation and decision making, and in
power over economic resources. Based on the 2003 Human Development Re-
port of the United Nations Development Programme.
GDP per capita: Per capita Gross Domestic Product in international $ PPP, 2005.
Based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (2005).
Women Access to Land: Women’s access to land ownership (between “1=full”
and “0=impossible”). Primarily based on Lang (1998).
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Women’s Access to Bank Loans: Women’s access to bank loans (between “1=full”
and “0=impossible”). Primarily based on Lang (1998).
Women’s Access to Property: Women’s rights to own property other than land
(between “0=no” and “1=yes”). Primarily based on Lang (1998).
Repudiation: Unilateral termination of marriage through husband’s repudia-
tion of his wife (level of discrimination between “0=not possible” and “1=legally
binding practice”). Primarily based on Lang (1998).
Early Marriage: Share of female population between ages 15 and 19 ever mar-
ried. Based on UNDP, Human Development Report (2005).
Polygyny: Acceptance of polygyny within a society (between “0=no” and “1=com-
plete acceptance”). Based on various primary sources.
Parental Authority: Parental authority granted to father and mother equally (be-
tween “0=no” and “1=yes”). Primarily based on Lang (1998).
Inheritance discrimination: Inheritance practices in favor of male heirs (level
between “0=no” and “1=yes”). Primarily based on Lang (1998).
Female Genital Mutilation: Prevalence of female genital mutilation (share of
women affected: “0=none”, “1=all”). Based on various sources (e.g. WHO,
Amnesty International, StopFGM).
Violence Against Women: Legislation punishing acts of violence against wo-
men; e.g. rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment (level of discrimination
between “0=specific legislation in place” and “1=no legislation in place”). Based
on UNIFEM, Not a Minute More - Ending Violence Against Women (2003).
Freedom of Movement: Freedom to move freely outside of the house (level of
discrimination between “0=yes” and “1=no”). Primarily based on Lang (1998).
Obligation to Wear a Veil in Public: Level of discrimination between “0=no”
and “1=full”. Primarily based on Lang (1998).
Contraceptive Prevalence: Percentage of women of reproductive age (15-49)
married or in a union who are using (or whose partner is using) a modern con-
traceptive method. Based on World Health Organization (2005).
Women’s Suffrage: Year in which the right to vote for women was recognized
on a universal and equal basis. If partial rights were recognized before full rights
were granted, we report the year of granting of the partial recognition of the right
to vote. Source: 2004 Human Development Report of the United Nations Devel-
35
opment Programme.
Women in Parliament: Seats in parliament held by women (as % of total). Based
on World Bank, Gender Stats (2005).
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Australia   HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 76.1 1902 24.7 0.754
Austria HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 50.8 1918 33.9 0.782
Bahrain HIC 0.5 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.75 0 0 61.8 1973 0 n/a
Belgium HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 78.4 1919 34.7 0.695
Canada  HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 74.7 1917 21.1 0.771
Denmark HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 78.0 1915 36.9 0.825
Finland HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 77.4 1906 37.5 0.801
France  HIC 1 1 0 0 0.01 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 74.6 1944 12.2 n/a
Germany HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 74.7 1918 32.8 0.776
Greece  HIC 0.98 0.98 0.02 0 0 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 n/a 1927 14 0.519
Hong Kong, China    HIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 86.2 n/a n/a n/a
Iceland HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 n/a 1915 30.2 0.847
Ireland HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 n/a 1918 13.3 0.683
Israel  HIC 0.8 0.8 0.2 0 0.15 0.85 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.1 0.1 68.0 1948 15 0.612
Italy   HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 60.2 1945 11.5 0.561
Japan   HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.67 0 0 55.9 1945 7.1 0.515
Korea, Rep. HIC 1 1 n/a 0 n/a 1 0 0 0.17 n/a 0 61.8 1948 13 0.363
Kuwait  HIC 0.5 1 0 0 1 0.2 0.8 0 0.5 0 0 50.2 n/a 0 n/a
Luxembourg  HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 n/a 1919 23.3 n/a
Malta   HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.67 0 0 n/a 1947 9.2 n/a
Netherlands HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 78.5 1919 36.7 0.794
New Zealand HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 74.9 1893 28.3 0.75
Norway  HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 73.8 1907 38.2 0.837
Portugal    HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 66.3 1931 19.5 0.647
Puerto Rico HIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.42 n/a n/a 77.7 n/a n/a n/a
Singapore   HIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.5 n/a n/a 62.0 1947 16 0.594
Slovenia    HIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a 73.8 1945 12.2 0.582
Spain   HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 80.9 1931 36 0.709
Sweden  HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 78.0 1861 45.3 0.831
Switzerland HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 82.0 1971 25 0.72
U.A.E. HIC 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.31 0.75 0.5 1 27.5 n/a 0 0.315
United Kingdom  HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.08 0 0 84.0 1918 18.1 0.675
United States   HIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 76.4 1920 15 0.76
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Argentina   UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 n/a 1947 33.7 n/a
Botswana    UMC 0.3 0.5 0.5 0 0.2 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 40.4 1965 11.1 0.564
Chile   UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 n/a 1931 12.5 0.467
Costa Rica  UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 75.0 1949 35.1 0.67
Croatia UMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.25 n/a n/a n/a 1945 21.7 0.534
Czech Republic  UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 72.0 1920 17 0.579
Estonia UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 70.3 1918 18.8 0.56
Gabon   UMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 n/a n/a 32.7 1956 9.2 n/a
Hungary UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 77.4 1918 9.1 0.518
Latvia  UMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a 48.0 1918 21 0.576
Lebanon UMC 0.5 1 0 0 0.1 0 0.7 0 0.75 0.5 0.5 61.0 1952 2.3 n/a
Libya   UMC 1 1 0 0.2 0.5 0.5 1 0 1 0 0 39.7 1964 n/a n/a
Lithuania   UMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.5 n/a n/a 46.6 1921 22 0.499
Malaysia    UMC 1 0.8 0 0 0.7 0 0.7 0.3 0.42 0 0 54.5 1957 9.1 0.503
Mauritius   UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 74.7 1956 5.7 n/a
Mexico  UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 68.4 1947 22.6 0.516
Oman    UMC 0 1 0 1 1 0.5 1 0.2 0.75 0.5 1 23.7 n/a 2.4 n/a
Panama  UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 58.2 1941 16.7 0.471
Poland  UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 49.4 1918 20.2 0.594
Saudi Arabia    UMC 0 0.2 0.8 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.7 1 31.8 n/a 0 n/a
Slovak Republic UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.67 0 0 74.0 1920 16.7 0.598
Trinidad and Tobago UMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.33 n/a n/a 38.2 1946 19.4 0.642
Uruguay UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 n/a 1932 12.1 0.516
Venezuela, RB   UMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 21.0 1946 9.7 0.441
Albania LMC 0.5 0.5 0.2 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0.75 0 0 57.5 1920 6.4 n/a
Algeria LMC 0.8 0.8 0.2 1 1 0 1 0 0.75 0 0 64.0 1962 6.2 n/a
Armenia LMC 1 1 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0.75 0 0 60.5 1921 5.3 n/a
Belarus LMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.5 n/a n/a 50.4 1919 29.4 n/a
Bolivia LMC 0.8 0.5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 53.4 1938 19.2 0.522
Bosnia & HerzegovinaLMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.5 n/a n/a 47.5 n/a 16.7 n/a
Brazil  LMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.58 0 0 76.7 1934 8.6 n/a
Bulgaria    LMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 41.5 1944 26.3 n/a
China   LMC 0.8 0.8 0.2 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0.58 0 0 83.8 1949 20.2 n/a
Colombia    LMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 76.9 1954 12 0.501
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Cuba    LMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 73.3 1934 36 n/a
Dominican Republic  LMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 64.7 1942 17.3 0.529
Ecuador LMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 65.8 1929 16 0.489
Egypt, Arab Rep.    LMC 1 1 0 0.9 1 0.1 0.9 0.97 0.75 0 0.7 56.1 1956 2.9 0.253
El Salvador LMC 0.9 0.9 0.1 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 59.7 1939 10.7 0.459
Fiji    LMC 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.75 0 0 41.0 1963 8.5 n/a
Guatemala   LMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.67 n/a n/a 38.2 1946 8.2 n/a
Honduras    LMC 0.4 0.7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.67 0 0 61.8 1955 5.5 0.408
Iran, Islamic Rep.  LMC 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 72.9 1963 4.1 n/a
Iraq    LMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 n/a n/a 13.7 n/a 31.6 n/a
Jamaica LMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.67 n/a n/a 65.9 1944 11.7 n/a
Jordan  LMC 0.2 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 0 0.25 0 0.8 55.8 1974 5.5 n/a
Kazakhstan  LMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.25 n/a n/a 66.1 1924 10.4 n/a
Macedonia   LMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.5 n/a n/a n/a 1946 19.2 n/a
Morocco LMC 0.8 0.8 0.2 1 1 0 1 0 0.25 0 0 50.3 1963 10.8 n/a
Namibia LMC 0.2 0.4 0.6 0 1 0.3 0.7 0 0.5 0 0 28.9 1989 25 0.578
Paraguay    LMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 0 57.4 1961 10 0.412
Peru    LMC 1 0.5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 68.9 1955 18.3 0.521
Philippines LMC 1 1 0 0 0 0.9 0.05 0 0.17 0 0 46.5 1937 15.3 0.539
Romania LMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 63.8 1929 11.1 0.46
Russian Federation  LMC 0.8 0.8 0.2 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 n/a 1918 9.8 0.44
Serbia & MontenegroLMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a 58.3 n/a 7.9 n/a
South Africa    LMC 0.1 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.7 1 0.1 0.42 0 0 56.3 1930 32.8 n/a
Sri Lanka   LMC 0.5 1 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.33 0 0 66.1 1931 4.9 0.272
Swaziland   LMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a 27.7 1968 10.8 n/a
Syrian Arab RepublicLMC 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.7 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 36.1 1949 12 n/a
Thailand    LMC 1 1 0 0 0 0.9 0 0 0.33 0 0 72.2 1932 10.6 0.457
Tunisia LMC 1 1 0 0 0 0.3 1 0 0.25 0 0 60.0 1957 22.8 n/a
Turkey  LMC 0.5 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 63.9 1930 4.4 0.29
Turkmenistan    LMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a 61.8 1927 26 n/a
Ukraine LMC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.42 0 0 67.5 1919 5.3 0.406
West Bank and GazaLMC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Afghanistan LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 n/a n/a 4.8 n/a n/a n/a
Angola  LIC 0.2 0.8 0.2 0 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0 0 6.2 1975 15 n/a
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Azerbaijan  LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a 55.4 1921 10.5 n/a
Bangladesh  LIC 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.8 1 0 1 0 0.08 0.3 0.5 53.8 1972 2 0.218
Benin   LIC 0 1 0 0 0.8 0 0.5 0.17 0.75 0 0 18.6 1956 7.2 n/a
Bhutan  LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.67 n/a n/a 18.8 1953 8.7 n/a
Burkina Faso    LIC 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.72 0.5 0.2 0 11.9 1958 11.7 n/a
Burundi LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a 15.7 1961 18.4 n/a
Cambodia    LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.58 n/a n/a 23.8 1955 9.8 0.347
Cameroon    LIC 0 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.75 0 0 19.3 1946 8.9 n/a
Central African Rep.LIC 0 1 0.4 0 0.7 0.5 1 0.43 0.75 0 0 27.9 1986 7.3 n/a
Chad    LIC 0 0.5 0.8 0.5 1 0 1 0.45 0.5 0.5 0.5 7.9 1958 6.5 n/a
Congo, Dem. Rep.    LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.05 0.75 n/a n/a 31.4 1967 12 n/a
Congo, Rep. LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a n/a 1963 8.5 n/a
Cote d'Ivoire   LIC 0.4 1 0 0.6 0.8 0 0.2 0.43 0.42 0 0 15.0 1952 8.5 n/a
Equatorial Guinea   LIC 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 n/a 1963 18 n/a
Eritrea LIC 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.2 1 0.95 0.5 0 0.5 8.0 1955 22 n/a
Ethiopia    LIC 0.3 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.75 0 0 8.1 1955 7.7 n/a
Gambia, The LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.8 0.5 n/a n/a 9.6 1960 13.2 n/a
Georgia LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a 40.5 1918 9.4 0.381
Ghana   LIC 0.3 0.5 0.5 0 1 0 0.7 0.25 0.58 0 0 22.0 1954 10.9 n/a
Guinea  LIC 0 1 0 0.8 1 0 0.2 0.99 0.5 0 0 6.2 1958 19.3 n/a
Guinea-Bissau   LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.5 1 n/a n/a 7.6 1977 14 n/a
Haiti   LIC 1 1 0 0 0.3 1 0 0 0.67 0 0 27.4 1950 3.6 n/a
India   LIC 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0 0.7 0 0.33 0.6 0.5 48.2 1950 8.3 n/a
Indonesia   LIC 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.5 1 0.2 0.1 0.67 0 0 57.4 1945 11.3 n/a
Kenya   LIC 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.6 1 1 0.38 0.17 0 0 39.0 1919 7.1 n/a
Korea, Dem. Rep.    LIC n/a n/a 0 n/a 0 n/a n/a n/a 1 0 n/a 80.5 n/a 20.1 n/a
Kyrgyz Republic LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.58 n/a n/a 59.5 1918 6.7 n/a
Lao PDR LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.42 n/a n/a 32.2 1958 22.9 n/a
Lesotho LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.25 n/a n/a 30.4 1965 11.7 n/a
Liberia LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.6 1 n/a n/a 6.4 n/a 5.3 n/a
Madagascar  LIC 1 1 0 0 0.2 0 0.1 0 0.75 0 0 18.8 1959 6.9 n/a
Malawi  LIC 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.75 0 0 30.6 1961 14 n/a
Mali    LIC 0 0.3 0.7 0.8 1 0 1 0.92 1 0 0 8.1 1956 10.2 n/a
Mauritania  LIC 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 0 1 0.25 0.5 0 0.5 8.0 1961 3.7 n/a
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Moldova LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.42 n/a n/a 62.4 1978 15.8 0.468
Mongolia    LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.58 n/a n/a 67.4 1924 6.8 n/a
Mozambique  LIC 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 1 0 1 0.4 0.75 0 0 5.6 1975 34.8 n/a
Myanmar LIC 1 1 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.75 0 0 32.7 1935 n/a n/a
Nepal   LIC 0 0.3 0.6 0 0.1 0 0.8 0 0.58 0 0 39.3 1951 5.9 n/a
Nicaragua   LIC 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 68.6 1955 20.7 n/a
Niger   LIC 0 0.7 0.8 1 1 0 1 0.05 1 0 0.8 14.0 1948 12.4 n/a
Nigeria LIC 0.2 0.2 0.5 0 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.25 0.75 0.5 0.5 15.3 1958 4.7 n/a
Pakistan    LIC 0.2 0.3 0.5 1 1 0 1 0.05 0.5 1 1 27.6 1947 21.3 0.414
Papua New Guinea    LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a 25.9 1964 0.9 n/a
Rwanda  LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 n/a n/a 13.2 1961 48.8 n/a
Senegal LIC 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.25 0 0 12.9 1945 19.2 n/a
Sierra Leone    LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.9 0.75 n/a n/a 4.3 1961 14.5 n/a
Somalia LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.98 0.75 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Sudan   LIC 0 0 1 0.8 1 0 1 0.89 0.75 0.7 1 8.3 1964 9.7 n/a
Tajikistan  LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.5 n/a n/a 33.9 1924 n/a n/a
Tanzania    LIC 0 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.65 0 1 0.18 0.25 0 0 25.4 n/a 21.4 n/a
Timor-Leste LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.83 n/a n/a n/a n/a 25.3 n/a
Togo    LIC 0 0.3 0.7 0 0.6 1 0.5 0.12 0.75 0 0 25.7 1945 6.2 n/a
Uganda  LIC 0.1 0.1 0.9 0 0.3 0 1 0.05 0.75 0 0 22.8 1962 23.9 n/a
Uzbekistan  LIC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.75 n/a n/a 67.2 1938 17.5 n/a
Vietnam LIC 0.5 0.7 0.3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.75 0 0 78.5 1946 27.3 n/a
Yemen, Rep. LIC 0 0.5 0.7 1 1 0 1 0.23 0.75 0.5 1 20.8 1967 0.3 0.127
Zambia  LIC 0.3 0.3 0.7 0 0.8 0.1 1 0 0.75 0 0 34.2 1962 12.7 n/a
Zimbabwe    LIC 0.1 0.3 0.7 0 0.8 0.5 1 0.1 0.67 0 0 53.5 1957 10 n/a
